Published October 15, 2025 | By: Brad Flynn
On July 17, 2025, the Office of Open Records (OOR) Executive Director, Liz Wagenseller published on OORs official blog ‘Artificial Intelligence and the Right-to-Know Law: Be Aware of the Risks.’ The article was aimed at agencies, requestors, and OOR to beware of artificial intelligence (AI) submissions (for better or worse), whether in the process of requesting records under the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL), or through appealing decisions to the OOR. The article couldn’t have come at a better time.
Wagenseller notes that while AI is being used in Pennsylvania to help manage public records, there are risks. While AI can make searching for information faster, it can also cause problems, like creating fake legal arguments buttressed by fictitious caselaw citations all of it that isn’t real, where it could be used to deceive agencies into releasing records. Or even more concerning, for a requestor to engage agencies in OOR appeals using manipulative arguments laced with phony legal theory and non-existent caselaw.
Bath Borough is no stranger to these emerging issues with AI. The Borough first wrote about this subject on July 8, 2023, in a news post entitle Don’t be fooled by Artificial Intelligence. Since the Borough first made mention of this issue, there has been numerous examples (from one requestor) where this is clearly a problem.
What’s presented here isn’t just a one-off error. There is a repeated pattern of abuse by a requestor, representing himself as a ‘pro-se’ litigant (meaning, representing himself without an attorney). This requestor wants OOR and the Courts to take leniency with him because he is not an attorney, even though he seems to be having fun impersonating one. (See Docket #2025-1943 for an email from the Requestor bragging about his use of ChatGTP.)
For three years, the Borough has been engaged with a resident, Michael Long and the RTKL. Long has generated numerous Right-to-Know Requests and filed several appeals to OOR. In one case, the Borough was compelled to challenge OOR’s Final Determination by way of filing a Petition for Review in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas. Along the way, Bath’s experience with AI and the RTKL has been a wake-up call to say the least.
The case citations and legal theory provided in this article were supplied by Long. In many cases, Long submitted legal filings with a ‘verification’ that the information he submitted was true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. Long made these verifications under penalty of perjury that his information was accurate. Did he mean it?
In the early stages of handling Long’s RTKRs and first appeal, the Borough suspected he was using some type of AI platform to create requests and arguments on appeal. The Borough first noted the issue during the appeal of his RTKR #11.2022 dated September 27, 2022, later appealed and docketed as OOR AP 2022-2675. In one example, the Borough was forced to respond to Long’s assertions on appeal that Section 502 of the RTKL establishes that an agency must designate an official or employee to act as the open-records officer. Long was arguing at the time that former Solicitor Jamie Kratz was unqualified to serve as the Borough’s Open Records Officer (ORO). What any of this had to do with the records at issue isn’t clear. Long went on to support his legal theory, claiming caselaw existed in Grove v. OOR (2012) where OOR allegedly determined that an ORO must be a local agency employee, as defined by the RTKL.
For context, the RTKL, Section 502 only speaks to an “agency shall designate an official or employee to act as the open-records officer” and neither the term ‘official’ nor ’employee’ is defined terms under the RTKL. Maybe a simple enough error, had it not been for Long’s legal citation that didn’t look quite right. After more investigation, it turned out the Grove v. OOR (2012) Long cited to does not exist. The case citation as captioned by Long was apparently fabricated out of thin air.
What’s more, Long argued that another case, Pennsylvania State Education v. Commonwealth (2013) held that the designation of a non-employee as the ORO is a violation of the RTKL. Here too, this case as captioned by Long does not exist. Long didn’t stop there as he went on to cite from two other OOR appeal cases.
Long repeated his claims that Kratz was an unqualified ORO and that two other OOR appeal cases supported this position: OOR Dkt. AP 2018-0892 and OOR Dkt. AP 2020-1529. However, AP 2018-0892 was a case involving Leonard Dixon v. Pennsylvania Department of Health where the requestor sought documents related to a birth. In that case, the agency demonstrated that the records sought are exempt from disclosure in accordance with the Pennsylvania Vital Statistics Law of 1953. Dixon’s request was denied on appeal by OOR. Long’s reference to AP 2018-0892 had absolutely nothing to do, at all, with the designation of a non-employee as the ORO in violation of the RTKL.
Even more troubling, at AP 2020-1529, this was an OOR appeal by requestor Marissa Bluestine and Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice v. Great Bend Borough Police Department. Long asserted this case supported his legal theory that Kratz was an unqualified ORO. In realty, AP 2020-1529 is a one-page acknowledgment from OOR, (two paragraphs) indicating the case was withdrawn from OOR. In other words, the requestor withdrew the Request and OOR never issued a Final Determination, let alone mentioned anything remotely related to the designation of non-employees as ORO in violation of the RTKL.
Long files RTKR #20.2023 dated May 17, 2023. In that saga, Long would later appeal to OOR docketed as OOR AP 2023-1598 and the case would carry through OOR and eventually with the Northampton Court of Common Pleas for more than a year and a half. Only this time, the Borough filed a Petition for Review with the County, challenging OOR’s Final Determination for a number of reasons. The Borough felt OOR overstepped its authority. A Petition for Review is relatively a straight-forward ‘statutory’ review process. In other words, there are two parties challenging a legal question in front of a judge on how rules were applied by a reviewing agency. The matter was unnecessarily drawn out because of Long’s extensive use of AI in court filings and frivolous motions.
For example, on January 10, 2024, Long filed a Motion to toss the Borough’s case because of procedural deficiencies. Long claimed with such confidence “IN RE S.S., 651 A.2d 174 (Pa. Super. 1994)” that this particular case contains “…codified rehearing procedures that automatically render the initial Final Determination issued by the Office of Open Records non-binding pending agency review.” However, when the Borough reviewed this case, in no way did it reference rehearing’s, reconsideration, or the code Long referenced. That’s because the case Long pointed to was instead an appeal from a child dependency matter having nothing to do with the RTKL.
In the same Motion, Long cited another case, Jacobs v. Halloran, 710 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1998) for the legal proposition that “parallel premature appeals at interim stages splinter court focus delaying outcomes.” Here again, upon further inspection, the Borough reviewed this case finding Jacobs v. Halloran had nothing to do with parallel premature appeals, as it instead was a case involving an appeal from judgement of a non-pros (dealing with a plaintiff’s failure to follow through with a lawsuit) and various equitable considerations case.
On June 5, 2024, Long perpetuates the County Petition by filing more arguments to dismiss the Borough’s case. In this new brief, Long claimed under his “Legal Analysis” that the “Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure (Pa. R.A.P.) govern the jurisdiction and procedures for appeals from government units like the OOR.” Long specifically turned to Pa. R.A.P 1701(b)(3) where he says, “addresses the effect of a reconsideration order on a previously filed appeal.” This claim from Long is absolutely false by code and case law. First, Pa. R.A.P. 103, Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to county courts of common pleas. Second, there was a case, Chambersburg Area School District v. Dorsey, No. 2012-849 (C.P. Franklin May 18, 2012) (Walsh, J.) noting that in the context of the RTKL appeal, that neither the Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply and affirmed 97 A.3d 1281 (Pa. Commw. 2014).
On June 8, 2024, Long claims in a Motion that the “Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has held that the filing of a petition for reconsideration renders the underlying order non-final for purpose of appeal.” Long said his argument was supported by the case Sossong v. Shineski, 63 A.3d 858, 862 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013). The Borough did not find a case captioned Sossong v. Shineski. Just another example of fabricated caselaw.
In the same June 8, 2024, filing, Long continued to claim the Borough’s Petition should be tossed out of court because it wasn’t properly served upon him. Long made several arguments in this regard. Long said that the ‘City of Philadelphia v. Frempong, 865 A.2d 314 (Pa. Commw. 2005) supported his legal proposition that “…the Commonwealth Court emphasized the importance with service requirements and that this case underscores the necessity of serving legal documents by certified mail to establish proper service.” This case, however, doesn’t speak to any of those legal propositions at all. The case never mentions service requirements let alone service by certified mail. Here again, Long in a sneaky manner, posited legal theory with a case citation that existed but had nothing to do with the legal proposition he stated.
The June 8, 2024, Motion by Long contained more fake case citations. Long asserted as fact that the “Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that service by regular mail alone is insufficient to satisfy the rules of Civil procedure. See Wilco Elec. v. Weco, 586, A.2d 956, 958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).” Only problem is, Wilco Elec. v. Weco is a case that does not exist as captioned by Long.
Again, the June 8, 2024, filing, Long argued, “The Borough may claim that any errors in service were inadvertent. However, inadvertent errors do not excuse non-compliance with mandatory service requirements. In Frychlund v. Way, 15 A.3d 521, 525 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) the court dismissed an appeal due to inadequate service methods, demonstrating that strict adherence to service rules is required.” Long went on to state, “the Borough may claim that any errors in filing the Praecipe of readiness were inadvertent. However, inadvertent errors do not excuse non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements…” again citing to Frychlund v. Way. Lots of legal theory and convincing arguments!
There’s just one problem. The Commonwealth Court case cited by Long, Frychlund v. Way, does not exist either. Long marches on…
Long claimed in another case, “Sullivan v. Zoning Hearing Board of Moosic Borough, 604 A.2d 776, 778 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) the Commonwealth Court held that an appeal may not be taken from an order granting reconsideration, as it is not a final order.” Long’s legal principle here, he continues, “…as the Borough’s first appeal was filed after the OOR granted reconsideration, making it an improper and ineffective attempt to preserve appeal rights.” Sounds like a reasonable argument. Except for the fact that Sullivan v. Zoning Hearing Board of Moosic Borough does not exist.
Long also argued in Thompson v. Cortese, 41 A.3d 855, 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012), that “the Pa Commonwealth Court highlighted that premature filing, including appeals and praecipes, are legally void and ineffective. The court emphasized that such filings waste judicial resources and delay the resolution of cases.” But again, the case Thompson v. Cortese does not exist!
From September through mid-October of 2024, Long went on a rapid-fire Motion filing rampage. Long filed a Motion for Protective Order, Legal Briefs in Support of Motions, Motion for Expert Witnesses, and Legal Briefs in Opposition to Motions. Long cited to a case City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 858 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2004) and Section 67.1302(a) proposing legal theories that neither of these cited sources actually contain. All the while, the Borough is combing through these useless filings, spending time and financial resources to combat Long’s flurry of fictitious filings.
On December 9, 2024, finally, and after the Borough warned Long of his conduct and following through on a Motion for Sanctions, the Court did impose sanctions against Long in the amount of $1,000. The Court agreed with the Borough and based its Order upon Long’s frivolous, vexatious, and bad faith filing of ‘Motion of Protection Order, Sanctions, and Injunctive Relief and Motion for Appointment of Court Experts’ all unsupported by legal authority, were irrelevant, and exceeded the scope of the sole issues at argument. Long later paid the Borough $1,000 for his foolishness. It didn’t even cover 10% of the legal fees required to review and respond to Long’s legal slop. Would a thousand-dollar penalty prevent Long from future bad faith filings? Not in the least!
On June 5, 2025, Long files a new RTKR #09.2025. This request leads to yet another appeal before OOR, docketed at OOR AP 2025-1943. Long goes all out, testing new legal theories. Long argues the Borough is ‘judicially estopped’ from making arguments pursuant to Section 705 concerning the creation of records under the RTKL. Long is saying the Borough can’t provide records in a previous RTK matter with him– even though the Borough provided records it wasn’t legally obligated to provide him– then claim in the current case certain records don’t exist. To back up Long’s argument, he said “Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995) [and that Bath is therefore] legally barred from arguing that producing Audit Trails constitutes impermissible record creation under judicial estoppel.” However, in OOR’s AP 2025-1943 Final Determination, it was noted that OOR is not a judicial agency, and judicial estoppel is inappropriate. OOR also concluded that Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 proved to be a completely different case than the one cited by Long.
During OOR AP 2025-1943, Long also tried to argue the legal doctrine of ‘four corners’. Meaning the Borough expanded the four corners of his Request to impermissibly refer and ultimately deny portions of the Request. Even though Long sent subsequent emails to the Borough, where he directed the Borough to incorporate his video demonstration on how to use QuickBooks as part of his Request. Long’s follow-up emails where clearly an attempt to provide further guidance and assistance to allow the Borough to grant the Request. OOR was unclear as to how Long could argue four corners doctrine at the same time as sending the Borough follow-up emails with information the Borough was also supposed to reference. Long’s attempt to argue the four corners doctrine, it was highly suspicious, but moreover logically flawed and baffling quite frankly. It leads to the likelihood Long used AI to fit-in the four corners theory, but in a case, where it didn’t make sense for the circumstance at hand.
On September 25, 2025, even after OOR has expanded access to records from the Borough at the conclusion of AP 2025-1943, Long files a Request for Reconsideration. In other words, Long desires OOR to re-evaluate the case and provide more access to records than what the RTKL allows. Long also wanted OOR to reverse its ruling entirely and find that the Borough acted in bad faith throughout the process.
In this new filing for Reconsideration, Long crafts several legal arguments. Long attacks the Borough’s sworn affidavits, saying the affidavits were accepted by OOR in error because the affidavits lacked evidence and are deficient on its face. Long supports his position by saying, “Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. St. Hillaire, 210 A.3d 1183, 1190 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) that the Commonwealth Court has repeatedly admonished that affidavits must be detailed non-conclusory and submitted in good faith.” Long’s Request for Reconsideration includes legal theory that he was unjustly blocked from records access because of a photocopy fee (which the Borough is authorized to charge under the RTKL). As an aside, Long never brought up the photocopy fee on appeal, but he tried to introduce the idea on Reconsideration. Long turns to another case, “IN RE Appeal of E. Rockhill Twp. Supervisors, 430 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1991)” where he claims this case supports his legal propositions that a “surcharge require proof of actual loss through examination of financial records.” Long even weaved additional arguments in his Reconsideration that “The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that retrieving and exporting data from an existing agency database does not constitute the ‘creation’ of a new record.” Long referred to Pennsylvania State Police v. Grove, 161 A.3d 877, 894 (Pa. 2017) for his ‘creation’ of record nugget.
The Borough never responded to Long’s nonsensical Request for Reconsideration. And thankfully, it didn’t have to.
On September 30, 2025, OOR issued a scathing denial of Long’s Request for Reconsideration. First, OOR found that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. St. Hillaire (actually 128 A.3d 859) lead to a case captioned Desamours v. State, a 2019 case from the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. OOR said, notwithstanding the citation error, the actual quote from Long does not exist in St. Hillaire at all. Next, OOR found that Long’s citation to IN RE Appeal of E. Rockhill Twp. Supervisors, 430 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) led to another Commonwealth Court case, Bi Lo Shop-N-Bag v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board— having nothing to do with Long’s legal propositions as claimed. OOR was unable to locate any case captioned IN RE Appeal of E. Rockhill Twp Supervisors. Finally, OOR found that the Grove opinion does not contain a holding Long said it did either. While the Grove decision contains analysis as to whether the redaction of a video record creates a new record, that analysis does not concern databases as Long said it does. OOR also found that page 894 (as cited by Long) of the Grove opinion clearly concerns whether a video contains criminal investigative material and does not involve data or databases whatsoever. OOR found that Long’s Request for Reconsideration contains multiple instances of citations or quotes that do not exist, making his request inherently unreliable.
OOR seems to have turned a corner. OOR also warned Long about the potential use of AI to present and summarize case citations with the use of AI and failing to verify the information. But would this damning reaction by OOR stop Long? No!
The Borough prepares for Long to file a Petition for Review with the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas related to AP 2025-1943, as he’s threatened (and claims to have already filed). Long is unfazed by his approach or the potential consequences of filing false court documents under penalty of perjury. If the Borough and Long end up back in Court, the stakes couldn’t be higher for Long should the Borough identify he misused caselaw and legal theory.
The unfortunate part will undoubtedly be another period where the Borough labors through more court filings by Long, likely containing the same recycled non-existent case law or invalid legal propositions. Either way, Bath’s experience will be unpleasant to taxpayers. As the Borough is forced to spend time and more financial resources on legal services to continue defending itself against Long’s delusions and overt abuse of process.
Until Pennsylvania acknowledges that AI is causing more problems under the RTKL– and takes steps to address its misuse, whether by limiting its role in appeals of RTKL, enforcing penalties for frivolous or AI-generated legal filings, cracking down on perjury, prohibiting AI in court submissions, or incorporating strict compliance with Case Citation Logs as some federal district courts now require–Bath’s experience with AI and the RTKL will continue to come at a cost to everyone.
